The present study delves into the bank-insurance model in Greece. The paper explores the market-based practices that surface through the bank-insurance interface, while delineating the possible theoretical corporate structures. The former is associated with a detailed review of various financial ventures aiming to unveil any corporate patterns in both cross-venture and time series framework. The existence of de jure limits and separate de facto boundaries, as expanded by loopholes and avoidance activities, is noticed. Apart from the "traditional" subsidiary model, a number of multi-ventures are detected as a result of the banking sector making inroads into the insurance business. The latter is associated with the presence of multinational firms and foreign direct investment in the region. The analysis is further extended into other aspects of the phenomenon by proposing a three-dimensional approach for bank-insurance distribution network, as well as examining the operational and strategic issues surrounding these financial conglomerates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, the bank-insurance model, or bancassurance as it is called in Europe, has become the subject of deliberation and negotiation between the institutions that has meant to bond. The implementation of such hybrid financial structure has been widely witnessed in a number of European countries, while in the UK and the US it has been a less popular choice. With the eruption of the multi-billion dollar bank mergers rapidly changing the financial landscape; the acquisition of Dresdner Bank by Allianz, in 2001 , signals the type of corporate colossus astride a diverse portfolio of financial services. Furthermore, fully integrated structures such as the ING and Fortis Group have combined the two businesses to reasonable success. Nonetheless, the cases of Citigroup and Credit Suisse with their subsequent divestments 1 readdress the contentious issue of the bank-insurance success.
Over last three decades, such hybrid corporate structures have engulfed fervent allies as well as rigid opponents. Arguments favoring the trend embrace market development, reduction in diseconomies of scale/scope, efficient restructuring, enhancement of managerial discipline and overall financial stability. Skeptics, on the other hand, argue that the feasibility of this structure is vulnerable due to non-real cost reductions, a range of conflicts of interest/culture and creation of superpowers. The debate still remains an open issue with clearly established arguments (Saunders, 1994) . Van den Berghe (1998) provides a thorough discussion into the challenges and threats of the insurance industry; while Saunders (1994 Saunders ( , 2004 argues that the phenomenon could improve the competence of financial institutions and reinforces the lack of research in this particular area. It is evident that evaluating and predicting the future of the insurance sector is one of the challenges posed over the next decades.
The overarching objective of the paper is to explore the bank-insurance model in the Greek market and discuss various aspects associated with it. Based on the objectives of this study, two questions are worth raising: a) why should one consider the Greek market? and b) how does the paper contribute to the current literature? Over the last five years, the Greek economy has experienced paces of growth that no other country in the Eurozone or 1 Note that in August 20, 2002 , Citigroup spun off the property and casualty division of Travelers, which was later merged with St. Paul Cos. In January 31, 2005, Citigroup sold its Travelers life insurance and annuity business to the US insurer MetLife for $11.5 billion. The deal includes an agreement that allows MetLife to distribute its products through Citigroup businesses worldwide. The deal completes the jettisoning of the Travelers business, which Citigroup acquired almost seven years ago. On the other side of the Atlantic, Credit Suisse entered a strategic alliance with Winterthur Swiss Insurance Company in 1995. On December 15, 1997, Credit Suisse Group merged with Winterhur and gives Credit Suisse a leading position in bank-insurance business around the world. Operationally, Winterthur remains an autonomous company within the Group. In 1998, Credit Suisse sold its reinsurance operations, while on June 30, 2001, the market witnesses the divestment the US reached 2 . Despite the recent international downturn, the GDP growth rate well exceeded 4% in comparison to gradually dived EU rates reaching a modest growth of 0.3%.
The economic growth rates owe, to a large extent, their rapid increase to the falling interest rates and to the significant increase in the private sector financing. Greece enjoys a positive budget surplus along with lower taxes, structural reforms and liberalization of the telecommunications and energy sectors. The latter is actually paving the way for privately owned utilities and joint ventures involving foreign partners. This upward trend is boosted even more by the extensive investments made for the Olympic Games. Greece is the most developed market in the Balkans and one of the most promising countries in Southern Europe in terms of recent economic and social developments. Its strategic location combined with well-developed areas such as the shipping and tourism sector, sets the ground to become a leading regional player.
Looking at the empirical literature, there are not many studies that have targeted the bank-insurance interface. From the existing literature the majority has concentrated on the US market [Boyd, Graham & Hewitt (1993) , Saunders & Walters (1994) , Gande, Puri & Saunders (1999) , Saunders (1999) , Lown, Osler, Strahan & Sufi (2000) , Carow (2001a,b) ] with only a handful of papers examining the European experience [Brown, Genetay & Molyneux (1996 ), Vander Vennet (2002 , Nurullah & Staikouras (2004) ] where the phenomenon has met considerable success. Moreover, the aforesaid studies concentrated on quantitative techniques, ignoring the equally important qualitative aspects of the phenomenon (Herring & Santomero, 1990) . The literature in the Greek bank-insurance market is nonexistent. The majority of information is usually disseminated though the financial press and is complemented by seminars/guidebooks that organized/compiled internally by financial institutions and multinational firms. There is not, at least to our knowledge, any comprehensive study that puts together the activities in this particular market. The interest in the Greek market is also triggered by the rapid expansion of the European Union and the fast pace of economic growth in Greece. Thus, the paper aims to fill this gap in the literature, to get some insight into the evolution of the phenomenon and at the same time to investigate its roots, as it is not be as "new" as it is actually perceived at least for the market under consideration.
of Winterthur International, the corporate insurance business, to the Bermuda-based financial services group XL Capital Ltd. 2 The interested reader is referred to the ESI (Economic Sentiment Indicator) of the European Commission and the LEI (Leading Economic Indicator) by the OECD. A more detailed analysis of economic indicators and the recent developments in the Greek economy is available from the author upon request.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the general structural forms of the phenomenon and introduces its legislative implementation in the Greek market. Section III, explores the bank-insurance ventures in the Greek market, and classifies the market-based practices according to their corporate structure. Section IV, proposes a three dimensional framework for the distribution network of these conglomerates; while Section V discusses various operational and strategic issues necessary for the viability of such synthetic financial intermediaries. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and looks at the possible extensions of the present study.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BANK-INSURANCE MODEL
Examining the phenomenon of bank-insurance convergence, one essentially refers to two distinctive providers of financial services, namely the bankers and insurers. One of the most interesting aspects of the interface, between banks and insurers, is the variety of partnerships within the phenomenon can thrive (Staikouras & Dickinson, 2005) . As it is discussed later in the paper, the phenomenon emerged in the Greek market in various ways and in some cases one observes an early de facto structure as opposed to the de jure implementation of the model. Theoretically, and in very broad terms, one can categorize the partnerships arrangements into the following three general tranches.
The first one is the horizontal alliance, where the bank enters into an agreement with an insurer(s) and the insurance products are promoted through the bank's branches (over the counter) or the bank directs its customers (referrals) to the particular insurer(s). In this case there is no restriction to the insurers involved. The bank can choose more than one alliances depending on the variety and quality of products provided by each insurance firm.
This kind of cooperation is also known as the multi-tie model. Note, that the reverse is always an option, where the insurance takes the lead in pursue of sharing networks. The second approach is the integrated partnership, where the bank and the insurance firm belong to the same group and both use their networks to sell their products. Under this structure, partnership loyalty is present and common targets are set, while full control of the crossselling process is feasible. This structure also bypasses inter-sector antagonism and/or potential rivalry. The third structure is the vertical venture, where in that case the insurer is a subsidiary of the bank and is completely controlled by the latter. In that venture, common strategies are set and the strengths of both partners can be exploited. Some of the products can also be specifically designed for the banking customers or other services redesigned to meet the needs of potential new clients. Finally, both banks and insurers can also establish an autonomous arm specializing in bank-insurance products, which is governed by both parties. This autonomous arm could be a sub-structure of the above partnerships or it could emerge as a fourth independent structure. It is usually the result of a joint venture between two institutions, which can devote a sufficient amount of capital (financial-human) and provide the necessary expertise and know-how.
The aforesaid bank-insurance models are by no means exhaustive, but still remain the broad categories, as other structures could emerge depending on the market, economic, legislative environment as well as cultural factors. It is also worth mentioning that no structure stands out as being significantly more successful and/or popular than others.
There are plenty of successful examples of all models in operation in different markets. It really comes down to how well the model is implemented and the blending of the diverse cultures involved (Staikouras, 2005b) . Dyer & Singh (1998) show that competitive advantage is vital to the survival of the alliance; while through a relational view they identify knowledge, relation-specific assets, effective governance and resources as the key fundamentals for success. Moreover, banks and insurers may simply maintain distribution channels with each other without forming a separate firm, thus requiring less capital investment than with a complete acquisition [Gardner, Mills & Cooperman (2000) ]. In today's financial markets where mergers and acquisitions have become the norm 3 , it is also practicable that multinational conglomerates may concurrently experience all three forms, in one way or another, in their operations across the world. When corporations start expanding and gaining a multinational status, thorough examinations of each potential partnership becomes crucial. The careful planning and analysis remain the cornerstone of the bank's strategy in order to understand the political and social culture as well as the regulatory environment; while meticulously train and monitor its agents, including their approach and selling points to their clients (Corman, 1998) . All the above pose a real governance challenge, especially when considering that strategic alliances are frequently subject to high instability, poor performance and longevity (Parkhe, 1993a,b) .
The success and formation of the bank-insurance model evidently depend upon a number of features of the particular country/region. For instance, the demographic profile of a country decides the kind of products bank-insurance will be dealing with, the economic situation will determine the trend in terms of turnover, market share etc., whereas the legislative, as well as the tax and regulatory, climate will demarcate the periphery within which the bank-insurance operates. Regarding the Greek market, the first law (400/70/54) 4 clearly precluded banks from acting as agents for insurance firms. Before Greece joined the EU, in 1981, the financial system could be described as one with strong government intervention, a distended deficit of the public sector, restrictive regulations and credit limitations. With the induction of Greece in the EU, the 1980s and early 1990s are stormed by waves of deregulation, rationalization of financial markets and harmonization with the various European directives. It was in the early 1990s that law 2076/92/16 allowed credit institutions to participate in insurance firms. One year later, with the 2170/93 law, the interface of the two institutions is materialized as banks can distribute insurance products and/or engage in collaborations with insurance firms. It would be very informative, however, to review the trends and corporate structures that took place in the domestic market over the last two decades, and this is what the paper turns to next.
III. RECENT TRENDS IN THE GREEK MARKET
Over the last few years, the bank-insurance term has become the new buzzword in the Greek market and economic press. A number of negotiations/agreements between banks and insurance companies have taken place and many more are expected to follow. At the moment there are not any official data, at least to our knowledge, of the breadth of the bank-insurance market. This is due to the fact that insurance firms, in Greece, are not obliged by the law to publish statistical information per distribution network. A number of professionals would intuitively claim that its market share is approximately 6%, but this is not officially confirmed. It is worth noting that the data of the present study are manually collected from press clippings, industry reports, company accounts and different directories.
In addition to that, banks, insurance companies and other institutions are also contacted 5 .
As summary of the recent bank-insurance market share is given on the following graph. Despite the fact that banks are already competing in the Greek bank-insurance market, the latter is still at an infancy stage. This is because most of these institutions either carry a limited number of "basic" bank-insurance products, or do not market them through their entire network of branches. Additionally, the customers in the Hellenic market are investing much less in bank-insurance products compared to those of other EU member states. Nevertheless, the predictions are that the bank-insurance market will substantially grow in the following years; as both banks and insurers will market their products more extensively and customers will turn to bank-insurance products due to the problematic social security system and the low return on saving accounts. During 2002 and 2003, the total bank-insurance production was €28,697,710 and €46,485,511 respectively. Although the reported 2003 figure represents a 3.5% of the total life market, the increase on a year-to-year basis amounts to 62% unveiling the growth prospects of the bank-insurance activities. The rest of this section reviews the current trends in the Hellenic market 6 .
a. Involvement of multinational firms
Since the end of 1995, the Dutch ING Group 7 , via Nationale Nederlanden and ING Bank, has materialized the convergence of the two sectors through a merging structure. In Development Bank (ETBA) 9 , which significantly increased its asset base and market share.
With 261 branches, the bank has a very strong presence in the Balkans and is involved in the real estate finance and investment market. It has also bought 98.56% of the Interbank in New York, and it is estimated that 15% of its profits will be generated by the banking activities outside Greece. At the same time, NovaBank 10 started a strategic joint effort with Interamerican Life. It was also decided to "freeze" the launch of the two subsidiaries (Nova 
b. Existing structures in the domestic market
The aforementioned alliances came to be added to some of the existing structures in the Greek market. The National Bank of Greece (NBG) Group has played a key role in promoting the products of its subsidiary Ethniki Insurance (Εϑνικη Ασϕαλιστικη). The latter is one of the main players in the area and captures over 20% of the Greek insurance market. Over the last six years Ethniki Insurance has put into practice new business plans and set new targets. Its operating costs and effectiveness are strictly monitored and the insurer aims to maintain its leading role in the local market. 
d. Classification of the bank-insurance patterns
Based on the analysis so far, it should be stressed that the bank-insurance expansion should not be seen only as a way of selling more financial products, but as a vehicle of supporting, complementing and strengthening banking and insurance activities. This is a realistic approach of assisting and encouraging the convergence of the two industries.
Recapitulating the findings, the research shows that financial institutions, and primarily banks, employ every form available to take advantage of the convergence in financial services. They promote their insurance subsidiaries through their banking network (referrals), establish alliances/collaborations with other insurance firms and/or form partnerships with multinational giants to benefit from their experience, while in some cases set up self-reliant bank-insurance entities. Appendix 1 illustrates the domestic and foreign participants in the Greek market along with the bank-insurance arrangements they have opted for. Analysis of the number of financial institutions per structure, the insurance type they are associated with and the number of ventures they form is provided in appendix 2.
It is evident, from appendix 1 and appendix 2 -panel A, that a large number of multinational firms 19 compete in the bank-insurance arena. One notable feature of the structural changes within insurance markets over the last decades is the increasing penetration of national insurance markets by foreign firms [Dickinson (1996) ]. These foreign financial institutions have already their subsidiaries operating in the Greek market, while establishing new alliances with both domestic and other foreign banks/insurance firms operating in the region. In supplying insurance services, a local presence is crucial to provide pre-sales service (risk assessment and product tailoring) and post-sales service (loss assessment and prompt settlement of claims). On the other hand, a large number of domestic banks have established networks with insurers/brokers within their corporate groups. Domestic and foreign alliances are also common, while autonomous joint ventures with domestic banks are only recently being explored by multinational giants, such as the Predica and ING cases. The financial groups which have been promoting this regional expansion have been the larger quoted companies with access to stock capital markets [Dickinson (1996) ].
Based on appendix 2 -panel B, the number of mixed insurance firms (providing coverage across a wide insurance spectrum) seems to dominate the alliances that banking institutions are entering into. The second most popular sector is the life insurance, followed by a few partnerships with non-life insurers. Furthermore, self-governing joint ventures concentrate on the life sector. This is probably the result of public awareness regarding investment-insurance services, development of the real estate market and subsequent need for mortgages, well-packaged pension schemes, combination of insurance-savings products, and insufficient national health provisions. Interestingly, the trend does not seem to adhere to a specific bank-insurance collaboration. Based on appendix 2 -panel C, it is noticeable that 35.3% (6 out of 17) financial institutions, across domestic and foreign firms, extended their collaboration by engaging in more than one form of partnerships. The latter will enable them to catch a bigger market share and diversify their risks as well as eliminate losses (in terms of market share, financial, reputation, efficiency etc.) from barren ventures.
Apart from the aforesaid cross-structure analysis, the phenomenon is even more interesting when one explores it in a time series framework (Staikouras, 2005a evident that one of the most popular structures is the subsidiary model. The latter is probably one of the most interesting structures in the Greek bank-insurance market, especially before Greece joined the EU. This "traditional" approach is as old as the history of the National Bank of Greece, when in 1891 NBG founded its insurance subsidiaryEthniki Insurance. In the 20 th century, other banks established/bought their own insurance subsidiaries. Thus indirectly, and probably unintentionally, these banks started shaping the first element of a bank-insurance structure. Looking at the history of the state-owned banks, particularly before the 1980s, it is apparent that the banks were used as a major selling point for raising awareness of the various insurance products. It is then that the banks were actually asking their customers to buy insurance, from their subsidiaries, for the loans they provided to them 20 . Thus, one could clearly argue that an element of de facto bank-insurance has existed in Greece for many years through this partnership between banks and insurance companies. The latter were subsidiaries of the state controlled banks, which in turn is in contrast to the de jure interface among financial institutions. This is a vibrant example where, in regulatory dialectic, the political process of regulation and economic forces of avoidance adapt to each other in a series of lagged responses. The phenomenon was later described in the literature as "loophole mining" and scholars have studied such behavior by financial intermediaries [Kane (1988 [Kane ( , 1996 , Carow & Heron (2002) , Carow & Kane (2002) ].
IV. A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO THE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
Corporate restructuring and formation of new financial structures have a direct impact on the way products and services are promoted and distributed/provided. Thus, further discussion is deemed necessary. Bankers and insurers should carefully integrate the various aspects that determine the competent promotion of their products in their analysis.
Competent not in term of increasing their sales, but in terms of identifying real customer needs and effectively satisfying them. Essentially, the complexity of the issue boils down to a three-dimensional picture accounting for product complexity, distribution channel and market integration and/or globalization. The latter is one of the most important The first building block is the simplest one referring to impersonal contact of product promotion and potential sale. This usually takes the form of customers visiting the internet, obtaining information through advertisements, television and respond back by mail or telephone. These are simple packaged products, easily identified without requiring the presence of a financial/insurance representative. In the majority of European countries telephone and internet deals have become the norm. Platform forces are usually bank employees that can spend limited time with their customers, due to their other duties, and usually refer the client to the financial advisor or the insurance representative. Their role within the bank can vary, as they could be information providers, customer service advisors, loan assistants etc. and they can usually sell simple products. Commissioned sales (CS) agents usually represent independent contractors and could be an effective sales force, as long as they are closely monitored, so sales quantity does not become the substitute of sales quality.
is attached to a host product such as mortgage or other loan, and is a condition of the sale of the host product.
It is easy to design a high commission product and suffer the loss of being unable to identify the relevant clientele. In the bank-insurance framework the base consists of the targeted market share and the needs of their clientele. That is, both the financial institution and the agent guide and serve the customers according to their preferences. In-house advisors are usually employees tied to the insurance branch with good knowledge of the insurance products available and able to further identify customers' needs. For example, a withdrawal from a deposit account could be associated with the purchase of a car, holiday package, domestic appliances, property or even relocation. An insurance advisor clearly knows that all these cases 21 require some sort of insurance such as personal accident, travel, content etc. and should be able to advice the client and promote the pertinent product. Finally, the specialists are employees that have an excellent knowledge of both banking and insurance products and can offer advice and guidance in the combination of both. Although our threedimensional illustration divides the services into four broad different levels, in practice it becomes more complicated, as dimensions and services are indistinctively interrelated.
Although one may graphically observe a level of service with three different dimensions, in practice market forces will eventually push all dimensions to the same height. Dimension misalignment will only take place as a transitory period. That is, one "cannot" have a market with complex products, limited distribution channels (infrastructure), but the market being segmented or less integrated/global; or one "cannot" experience in a very integrated (least segmented) market the absence of complex products and nonexistent distribution building blocks. As we move towards the tip of the pyramid, we clearly observe the various levels of product promotion and advice required. The most effective way to achieve their goals, strategic and financial, will be driven by the customer needs and market preferences rather than products.
Despite the advances in the ways insurance products are packaged and distributed, it is only recently that the Greek market has started adopting new methods of communication such as internet, phone-banking, bank-insurance, e-banking etc. It is estimated that the traditional company sales forces is going to be reduced from 76% in 2000 to 51% over the next years. Internet is expected to be the fastest growing distribution channel with an increase of around 8%-11% in market share over the next four to six years.
We believe, however, that the growth figure for the latter is quite underestimated. The following graph displays the expected trends in the market. Many market professionals believe that in the near future bank-insurance will become more important as a distribution channel than it is now. Apart from the market attributes, previously mentioned, another set of factors embraces customer attitudes and habits offering a fertile terrain for the Greek bank-insurance. Unlike their European counterparts, Greek customers tend to bank with one institution, and thus reducing the likelihood that they will go to competitors for their insurance products. Furthermore, they are extremely brand loyal and tend to view their banks as financial supermarkets. As earlier discussed, many insurers have already teamed up with banks, since partnerships with the latter are seen as essential for distribution purposes and economies of scale/scope. Despite the various projections, the changes in the market are phenomenal and one should not be surprised if some of the channels will under/outperform any forecasts. Kazantzis (2000) provides an excellent discussion and critically reviews the financial sector, discusses the possible interface among financial services and points out the need for product differentiation and target diversification.
V. OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES
The analysis so far has focused on the corporate structures, the trends in the domestic bank-insurance market and on the proposed dynamics of the distribution network.
It is equally important, though, to examine the roots of such trend, its operational characteristics, the strategic benefits of those partnerships, as well as the role of governing bodies and regulators (Santomero & Eckles, 2000) . The complex interaction among those forces does affect and determine the strategy employed by the financial intermediaries involved.
One of the obvious factors behind the evolution of the interface between bankers and insurers is the changing economic conditions at both micro and macro level. report that the risk profile of financial conglomerates is better compared with vertically divided markets. Economies of scope, in the bank-insurance framework, have also been discussed and analyzed by others; with banks being more revenue efficient while insurers are being more cost efficient [Dickinson (1993) , Jung (2000) ].
Diversification could act as an effective risk management vehicle, but the way the bancassurer handles the funds received and subsequently invested is also crucial. Bankinsurance providers should aim to generate a high fee income and thus increase the return on invested capital. Although the former is an appealing extra source of income, it should not be carelessly welcomed, since it is not as cost-free and/or risk-free as some might be tempted to argue. The bank involved would certainly need a minimum level of training for its bank-insurance staff, IT development, a different marketing support and promotion campaign, which would noticeably increase its costs. Moreover, if the bank does not have full control of the product's development and structure, there might be similar products that could be equally competitive; and, after all, is the bank as flexible as the insurance firm is?
That is, should the market changes, the insurance firms are usually more responsive to those changes than the banks are. It is fair to say that insurance distribution tends to be more 23 The terms employed here should not actually implicate only regulators but bankers, insurers and any other flexible than banking, as the former is based on variable costs compared with the fixed expenses of bank branches. Finally, any collaboration that is simply based on increased cash flows will always bear an element of reputation risk and might possibly result in an expensive divorce. On the other hand, there are benefits to insurers by collaborating with banks. First of all, the collaboration of financial institutions will enhance the image and increase the prestige of the products/services provided. The possibility of cross-selling turns into reality, while the market share and client penetration of the insurer increases multiplicatively. The new distribution channel is relatively cheap and offers access to the middle-income segment. The latter comprises the vast majority of a bank's clientele and, thus, new clients and higher turnover surface. Last but not least, information for one customer for multiple products reduces diseconomies of scope, procurement costs and risk assessment becomes easier. Under these structures financial institutions can exchange information and risk databases, which otherwise would be impossible to obtain and evidently very expensive. Through that complicated process of sharing benefits and risks, financial institutions should be in a position to offer peace of mind to their customers, low cost products, efficient product delivery, as well as transparent, effective and high quality services.
VI. CONCLUSION
One of the notable characteristics of modern financial markets is the convergence among financial institutions, which until recently performed separate tasks. To this end, this paper reviews and analyzes the bank-insurance experience in the Greek market. For a number of reasons discussed in the introduction, the particular market provides an interesting landscape for academic and practical purposes.
The analysis reveals the presence of multinational firms exploiting the knowledge of domestic financial institutions and creating hybrid providers of financial services. It is evident that banks are making inroads into the insurance business with, in some cases, multi-structural deals being in place with various insurers. The majority of banks seem to adhere to the classical subsidiary model with attempts, after the mid 1990s, being made to establish alliances/collaborations with other domestic and foreign financial institutions. It is only recently that multinational insurers set up autonomous joint ventures with major local banks, and thus paving the way for an integrated provider of financial services. Regarding participant in the financial service industry.
the type of insurance business, the findings show that the majority are mixed insurers followed by life and non-life providers.
The study further proposes a three-dimensional approach for better understanding the distribution network. The importance of the distribution network is ably hidden behind cost and profit efficiency, form of interface in place, type of institutions involved and market idiosyncrasy. The three dynamics put forward embrace product/service complexity, distribution infrastructure and market segmentation. Finally, the paper discusses a number of operational and strategic issues that would help to make the phenomenon viable and/or prevent its conception in case these issues are not carefully considered. The latter would evidently have a number of negative externalities for both their clientele and the economy as a whole.
Despite the efforts of various studies to examine the bank-insurance structure from a quantitative angle, the overlooked qualitative elements remain equally crucial. A number of questions should be addressed and further research is deemed necessary. How ease would be for banks to adopt an underwriting function? It may well be the case that the bank could remain a powerful distributor. The profit and cost efficiencies associated with these ventures may generate hard-to-verify benefits. From the whole economy's point of view, do such structures impose any financial and/or social costs on tax payers? Moreover, the importance of synergies is manifested in most annual reports. Thus, further investigation should be conducted on the kind of synergies financial institutions pursue and how they actually pursue them.
Market-Based Bank-Insurance Ventures. The first column is the bank/insurance firms which seek to enter to the bank-insurance arena. This is the reference column for the rest four columns. 2 The second column is the bank/insurance firms which are part of a group or subsidiary of the firms in the first column. 3 The third column is the domestic firms which have created an alliance with the firms in the first column. 4 The fourth column is the foreign firms which have created an alliance with the firms in the first column. 5 The fifth column presents separate financial entities that have been created as a result of a joint venture between banks and insurers. It does not mean, however, that the other collaborations are not in the context of the bank-insurance framework. They simply represent different structures.
* The letters in parentheses symbolize the nature of the insurance company. That is, M, G and C stand for mixed, non-life (general in the UK jargon) and credit respectively. The rest are life insurance firms and insurance agencies.
